Youth Radicalization in the Coastal Region
This is the Twelfth Issue of Nguzo za Haki, (the Pillars of Rights), published by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) in conjunction with the University of Nairobi. The KNCHR produces Nguzo za Haki at least twice a year, as part of its programme of research. It aims at keeping Kenyans and the world informed of the Commission’s activities, raising awareness on topical issues of human rights, and highlighting the challenges of human rights with a view to activating individual, collective and official action.

In publishing Nguzo za Haki, the National Commission is determined to provide its readers with well researched analytical articles on human rights issues that should contribute to relevant policy formation and provide programmatic ideas on effective approaches to human rights work. The articles also review political, economic, social and cultural issues impacting on human rights.

The publication carries a section “Editors Choice, In a Few Words” that reviews books and publications of choice. In each Issue of Nguzo za Haki, we will carry about four guest contributor articles. The Editorial Team invites articles that fall within the broad categories described above. Since we intend to reach a varied audience, the articles should not be too technical as to be inaccessible to the intended audiences. Case studies of innovative, practical ideas on enhancing the protection and promotion of human rights are particularly encouraged.

This issue of Nguzo is however unique in its composition and outlook. The first of its kind, focused mainly on the reporting of a research of a topical issue as deemed prevalent in the period of writing this publication.
Acknowledgments

The conduct of this study benefitted immensely from the participation of many people in their collective and individual capacities.

First we wish to thank Evelyne Samba, Deputy Commission Secretary Kenya National Commission on Human Rights for the continuous support at the various stages of the study.

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Mr Apollos Olando did splendid work in data analysis: cleaning, coding and analysis within the agreed time frame. We also thank the members of the public in Kwale, Mombasa and Kilifi who provided us with information on this very sensitive topic. For some as victims of the various faces of radicalization it was emotive to discuss this contemporary issue that bedevils their households, neighbourhoods and the coast region in general.

The interpretation of the information and the writing of the report was the work of the researchers: Dr. Beneah Mutsotso (University of Nairobi) and Dr. Bernard Mogesa (KNCHR).

Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Corporation</td>
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<td>CDs</td>
<td>Compact Disks</td>
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<td>C-WES</td>
<td>Constituency Women Enterprise Scheme</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Identity Card</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>KNCHR</td>
<td>Kenya National Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>KYEP</td>
<td>Kenya Youth Empowerment Project</td>
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<td>MTEP</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Plan</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WEDF</td>
<td>Women Enterprise and Development Fund</td>
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<td>YESA</td>
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One of the challenges of tackling violent radicalization lies in the elusiveness of the concept. The possible motivation, ideas and other factors that drive an individual towards violent radicalization can be diverse and complex. Further, no single factor can be sufficient to explain violent radicalization nor is there a single profile of individuals that have become radicalized. Its association with terrorism has always been problematic as well hence the concern whether radicalized individuals are necessarily terrorists, at least in its everyday conception. The assumptions based on past or current individual cases have glaring limits in application.

There also exist broad stereotypes based on assumptions of race, religion, ethnic group, sex, socio-economic status; these are unreliable since they are not exhaustive and are often laced with discrimination (OSCE, 2014). Although no agreeable definition of the concept exists, there is no doubt that it implies the process through which an individual or group of individuals (in this case youth), adopt increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals or aspirations that mainly reject or question the status quo. What is also common in the cross-cultural definitions is the movement from moderate to extreme beliefs often accompanied by violence.

Possession of radical views in itself is not necessarily a problem, for some of the scientific discoveries or movements of liberation were born out of radicalized views. However, the moment radicalization becomes a problem to society is when it begins to glorify, justify or practice violence. In its current form, violent radicalization is still contemporary, having come to the fore from late 1990s. Drawing from a rational choice perspective, the presence of mutual aid networks enhances its survival as the radicalized groups receive support and protection from the people, thereby making state detection difficult (Berman, 2009). The mutual aid networks operate within a voluntary (and later involuntary) and reciprocal exchange of goods and services based on certain norms. In the context of radicalized groups, the norms require the members to conform to the course, restrict the members’ consumption of social interaction opportunities that may cause them to question the decisions made prior.

The idea is to make those committed to the radical ideas limited in contact with the free people. Violent radicalization is the process whereby an individual comes to accept violence as a possible and legitimate course of action. This process does not take place in a vacuum. It takes place between an individual and a multiplicity of other influencers including actions by public authorities and other active recruiters. Equally noted is that there exist push and pull factors into violent radicalization (Silke, 2003).

An appealing recruiter may pull innocent or unsuspecting youth into a radical framework. Experience of violence at a personal level including at the hands of the police might make an innocent person attracted to anti-social ways such as violent radicalization as a pay-back.

Human Rights and Measures to Counter Radicalization/Terrorism
Police, in particular, have the duty to protect all individuals within their areas of operation. The police have an obligation to protect the rights of individuals: these include the right to life, the right
to security, the right to a livelihood, the right to freedom of association and other fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the need for the police to adopt a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy while upholding human rights is fundamental to police operations. The police must be held accountable for their actions if they are to win the trust, cooperation and support of the public. Irrespective of the seriousness of radicalization, human rights cannot be curtailed. This means that investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related criminal cases should be based on specific evidence; due process should be followed; fair trial should be guaranteed; and the police should be restrained from subjecting suspects to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (OSCE/ODIHR, 2013).

The United Nations (UN) Global Counter Terrorism Strategy provides a holistic approach to counter terrorism that involve measures aimed at addressing not only the conditions that are conducive to the spread of radicalization but to also ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism (UN, 2006). The UN Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003) obliges nation states to ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with international law, in particular, international human rights law.

The legitimacy of state actions against terrorism and its variants will be undermined if it uses power corruptly to contravene human rights. This will be interpreted as impunity on the part of the state transacting in unlawful counter-terrorism measures. Counter-terrorism measures should allow for independent and impartial oversight, often performed by NGOs, the media and the public. Lack of civilian oversight in this case, undermines counter-terrorism/radicalization measures but also proves counterproductive by formenting what it is supposed to control or stop. An OSCE (2014) report notes that:

Supporting a humanistic approach to countering violent radicalization, the OSCE (2014) further notes that: “The police play a central role in countering terrorism, it is particularly crucial, that the police be held accountable for their actions - ranging from the behaviour of individual police officers, commanders decisions, planning and implementation of specific operations, to ensure legitimacy, confidence, trust and support from the public. All police officers are ultimately bound by the law and should be held responsible for infringements of the law.”

Emergence of Youth Radicalization

There is no uniform set of factors that generate radicalization across regions or social categories. However, OSCE (2007) observed that: existence of prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in several ways, absence of the rule of law, violation of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance nurture radicalization.

Lack of an effective oversight and accountability of counter terrorism policies and measures, whether real or perceived, undermines public confidence in the counter terrorism actions of public authorities and the readiness of the public to actively support countering terrorism (OSCE, 2014)

Psychological and cognitive factors are key to unraveling the development of radicalized thinking in individuals. Psychological and cognitive factors help one to define his /her image, identity, belonging, attitudes, expectations and greatly influence how a person experiences and reacts to what obtains in his /her environment (Horgan and Taylor, 2006).

According to Crenshaw (1981), psychological and cognitive factors can influence the emergence of negative feelings of exclusion, rejection, relative deprivation, humiliation, victimization, injustice, frustrations, revolt or superiority. Such conditions are conducive for absorption of radicalized views and tendencies. Where such conditions exist youth are the most susceptible as questions of identity and their future abound in their mind frame.

Exposure to ideas and narratives that legitimize radicalization and glorify its appeal is another pull factor as well as the existence of tailor-made messages packaged to fit the situation in which the targets live (Sageman, 2004). Given the
multifaceted nature of violent radicalization, there are no straight answers to the problem nor can single-track approaches help. A hybrid system of intelligence gathering, research and face to face consultations can yield more plausible insights.

OSCE (2012) provided a useful way of addressing the inter-connected conditions that nurture violent radicalization. They include:

- Addressing the negative socio-economic factors such as corruption and bad governance, high level of unemployment especially among the youth.
- Strengthening the rule of law, democratic policing, promoting dialogue between the state and the public, police and the public, respect for human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms.
- Addressing intolerance and discrimination, mutual respect, co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious, linguistic and other groups.
- Preventing violent conflicts, promoting peaceful settlement of disputes and resolution of existing conflicts.

Equally important is the need to counter the existing narratives used by recruiters to lure the unsuspecting and vulnerable youth. The narratives need to be understood first and credible voices used to counter them. Use of facts in the counter narrative messages to the target audience of violent radicalization would be a useful way out. However, this should not be done in isolation from other counter-radicalization approaches. Engagement of those who have fallen (returnees) from the path of violent radicalization can be useful in designing effective counter-radicalization messages.

Therefore areas with the following conditions present: social interactions and interpersonal relationships drawing an individual towards violent radicalization: presence of psychological and cognitive factors e.g. trauma, negative feelings, feeling marginalized; and exposure to ideas and narratives that legitimize violent radicalization pose great risk. In addition, areas that share two or the three socio-economic and psychological conditions have the greatest risk of radicalization.

**Countering Violent Radicalization**

Observation of the rule of law and human rights standards is central to the effective fight against violent radicalization which is not only sustainable but which also enjoys the support of the public. Repressive approaches are highly unlikely to elicit the desired results. The traditional policing methods of law enforcement need to be supplemented with preventive efforts that address the conditions that nurture violent radicalization.

Terrorism and its variants aim to destroy human rights and the rule of law. Therefore, states have the obligation to take steps to prevent violent radicalization, but as duty bearers, they ought to conduct themselves within the ambit of the law. Complying with human rights does not in any way prevent state agencies from developing effective and sustainable counter-violent radicalization approaches. States need to be wary of those measures that constrain human rights which are absolute and cannot be limited under any conditions – for instance, protection from torture and other cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment.

The fight against violent radicalization is not a justification for torture or ill-treatment. Discrimination on account of race, religion, color, sex, political opinion, social or national origin, birth, belonging to a particular group is not justifiable under any circumstance. Violation of these rights can contribute to violent radicalization (Rejali, 2009; Ginbar, 2010). Certain human rights, however, may be restricted under exceptional circumstances. These may include the protection of public safety or national security but care has to be taken to ensure there are no discriminatory practices (OSCE, 2014).

In its current form, radicalization is still contemporary, having come to the fore in the late 1990’s. Drawing from a rational choice, the presence of mutual aid networks enhances the survival of radicalised groups allowing them to receive support and protection from the people, thereby making state detection difficult (Berman, 2009). The mutual aid networks operate within a voluntary (and later involuntary) and reciprocal exchange of goods and services based on certain norms. In the context of radicalized groups, the norms require the members to conform to the course, restrict the members’ consumption of social interaction opportunities that may cause them to question the decisions made prior. The idea is to make those committed to the radical ideas more constrained and limited in contact with the free people.
**Prisons as Centres of Radicalization**

Prisons are vulnerable to radicalization since radicalized individuals use their time in prison to mobilize support, radicalize other prisoners and even recreate operational command structures. Neumann (2010) implored prisons services to be more ambitious in promoting positive influence inside prisons as well as developing more innovative approaches to facilitate prisoners’ transition into the mainstream society. Such efforts can lead to collective de-radicalization and disengagement which may include a political settlement and full re-integration into society.

**Use of Internet**

The ongoing conflict in Syria presents useful lessons for Kenya on how foreign radicals use the internet to document their involvement in real time with a view to inspiring others to join (Carter, Maher and Neumann, 2014). The internet is increasingly used to radicalize home-grown domestic extremists. Therefore, countering online radicalization should continue to be a major priority for governments (Stevens and Neumann, 2009). One strategy to help counter online radicalization is to create an environment in which production and consumption of radicalization material is difficult as well as socially unacceptable or less desirable. According to Stevens and Newmann (2012), the strategy should deter producers of extremist materials, empower online communities to self-regulate, reduce the appeal of extremist messages and promote positive messages.

**Policy Framework**

In order to address the complex and multi-faceted nature of radicalization, the government of Kenya developed several policies to guide its response. The response took the form of improving the welfare of the youth who are the targets and perpetrators of radicalization. Some of these policies are outlined below.

**The Kenya Youth Empowerment Project**

The Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP) was meant to support the government’s efforts to increase youth access to temporary employment. Its most prominent outfit was the Kazi kwa Vijana project. The aim was to employ youth in labour intensive public works in projects implemented by various ministries. It was meant to create income generation opportunities among the youth. The project was implemented under the overall supervision and guidance of a national steering committee chaired by the Prime Minister.

The implementing Ministries were: Water and Irrigation, Regional Development Authorities, Roads, Forestry and Wildlife, Environment and National Resources, and Local Government. Each ministry was responsible for its line projects initiated and was expected to account for the funds allocated. Each project was implemented by a unit (typically consisting of 11-50 youth) drawn from the locality.

The idea of engaging youth in employment was first mooted in 2007 when the government preferred a multi-sectoral approach to addressing the problem of youth unemployment. It was funded to the tune of Kshs. 4.3 billion. In activating the KYEP, the government launched Kazi Kwa Vijana in 2009. The aim was to employ both rural and urban youth in labour intensive public works. The projects were not only small scale but were rapidly implemented across the country within 3 – 6 months. Its implementation was diverse as
it ranged from hiring individual youth or forming youth groups to be contracted collectively. The agreements were varied and depended on special arrangements between ministries/departments and the youth. In the 2009/2010 financial year, the programme employed between 200,000 – 300,000 youth across the country. The employment enabled them to support themselves and their families using socially approved means and in the process minimized vulnerability to radicalization, crime and other forms of anti-social behaviour. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) supported this initiative through additional funding. The World Bank (2011) reported that the project implemented 406 public works implemented through six ministries in eight counties.

**The Youth Development Fund**
The Youth Development Fund was established in 2006 with the sole purpose of reducing unemployment among the youth who comprise about 60% of the unemployed people. It targeted young people aged between 18 – 35 years. The Fund was gazetted in 2006 and later transformed into a State Agency in 2007. Its focus was enterprise development among the youth with the view to increasing economic opportunities. In 2008, the Fund developed a three year Strategic Plan to address the needs and aspirations of the youth. In line with the Medium Term Expenditure Plan (MTEP) of the Vision 2030, the Fund transformed into a Revolving Fund. Its objectives are youth-focused.

They include: providing loans for on-ward lending to youth enterprises; attracting and facilitating investment in micro enterprises beneficial to youth, support youth-oriented micro enterprises develop linkages with large enterprises, facilitate marketing of products and services from youth enterprises in local and external markets and provide business development services to youth enterprises. So far the Fund has financed in excess of 157,000 youth enterprises to the tune of Kshs. 5.9 billion. It has helped thousands of youth build their enterprises through market support and entrepreneurship training.

In the first five years, the Fund created 300,000 employment opportunities. The Fund also supported thousands of youth to take up employment overseas through the Youth Employment Scheme Abroad (YESA). In order to reach more youth in all parts of the country, the Fund partnered with financial intermediaries including banks, NGOs, savings and credit societies and microfinance institutions. The youth can access loans of up to Kshs. 500,000 for either start-ups or for business expansion. The loans attract an 8% interest per annum.

**Uwezo Fund**
The Uwezo Fund targets youth and women. It originated from the President Uhuru Kenyatta’s pledge to allocate the Kshs. 6 billion that had been set aside for the presidential runoff (but which did not materialise) to youth and women groups. Its objectives were: to expand access to finance through grants and credit to promote youth and women enterprises; and to generate gainful self-employment for youth and women.

The Fund is governed by the following principles: representation to ensure the inclusion of all Kenyans, accountability to ensure the government is held responsible for its actions, accessibility to all the people and use of the best but least cost mechanism to achieve desired objectives. It targets to fund youth and women group enterprises. The eligibility criteria of youth and women groups is simple.

The age bracket 18 – 35 years of age, group in existence for the last six months prior to application, operating in a constituency where the application is made, evidence of monthly contributions, ownership of a bank account and a recommendation by the local chief. The Fund also accepts applications from religious groups which are required to meet very basic criteria. Loan operating procedures are quite friendly: A Kshs. 40,000 – 500,000 loan is payable to the group at a time. The group enjoys a six month grace period before starting to repay in monthly installments. The loan attracts a 3% interest per annum.

**The Women Enterprise Development Fund**
The Women’s Enterprises Development Fund (WEDF) was introduced in the 2007/2008 financial year to provide support to women entrepreneurs. It disburses loans through microfinance institutions, NGOs and SACCOs who in turn lend it to women-owned enterprises. The Fund also supports the capacity building of the beneficiaries as well as facilitating the marketing of products and services of women enterprises in local and external markets.

Qualification for the Fund loan is based on basic
criteria such as being a woman of 18 years and above; being a Kenyan and demonstrable intention to invest in a business. For group applications they must be appropriately registered. Those who obtain the loan through the Constituency Women Enterprise Scheme (C-WES) repay the loan with no interest apart from the 5% administrative fee paid at source. Those who access the loan through financial intermediaries pay an 8% interest per annum. Therefore the government of Kenya has in place a diversity of accessible–easy-to reach financial products at the disposal of youth to engage in meaningful tasks and employment creation free from criminal tendencies.

The Legal Framework
The Constitution of Kenya 2010 recognizes that the general rules of international law, treaties and conventions ratified by Kenya are part of the laws of Kenya. The country is a member of the United Nations and is bound by the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by virtue of Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations. Kenya ratified the UN Conventions aimed at addressing terrorism and terrorism financing.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (No. 30 of 2012)
The Act establishes the Counter-Financing of Terrorism Inter-Ministerial Committee as the implementation committee. The committee is made up of Cabinet Secretaries responsible for: Internal Security (Chair), Finance, Foreign Affairs, Attorney - General, Director - General of National Intelligence Service, Inspector - General of Police, Director - General of the Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service, Governor of the Central Bank and the Director of the Financial Reporting Centre.

The functions of the committee are to implement Resolutions 1267, 1373, 1718 and 1988 relating to the suppression and disruption of the proliferation, financing and dealings with weapons of mass destruction. Others are to formulate and supervise the implementation of the national strategy and action plan on counter financing of terrorism and perform any other function conferred on it by any other written law. The committee has power to detect, freeze or seize the funds or the property of a designated entity under any written law.

The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (No. 9 of 2009)
This is an Act of parliament that introduces measures for combating money laundering. The Act also provides for the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. The Act criminalizes money laundering and related offences including any involvement in terms of enabling, assisting, disguising or concealing anyone who commits an offence related to money laundering or acquisition, use and possession of any property known to be from the proceeds of money laundering is an offence. In addition, failure to report suspicion regarding proceeds of crime is equally punishable.

It is an offence to knowingly transport, transmit, transfer or receive or attempt to do all the above. The Act creates the Financial Reporting Centre. Its main objective is to assist in the identification of the proceeds of crime and the combating of money laundering by making information collected by it available to investigating officers and other relevant institutions, exchange information with similar bodies in other countries and ensuring compliance with international standards and best practices in anti-money laundering measures.

The Centre receives and analyses reports of unusual or suspicious transactions made by a reporting institution. The Centre has the mandate to undertake an investigation in the reporting institution concerned and all necessary documents must be availed to the investigating officer. The Centre can also require any person who is a current or former employee to provide assistance to the investigating officer. In Part IV, anti-money laundering obligations of a reporting institution are provided. A reporting institution must monitor on an ongoing basis all complex, unusual, suspicious, large or other transactions. In Part VI is established the Assets Recovery Agency under the office of the Attorney General.

The Prevention of Organized Crimes Act No. 6 of 2010
The Prevention of Organized Crimes Act No. 6 was enacted in 2010 to help prevent organized crime and aid the recovery of proceeds of organized criminal group activities. The Act defines engagement in organized criminal activity under the following conditions: being a member or professing to be member; advice, cause, encourage or recruit other persons to join; act in concert with other persons in commission of serious offences to obtain material or financial help; threaten or facilitate the commission of a crime. Further, engagement in organized criminal activity includes intention to extort or
gain anything from any person or group; attempt to kidnap another person; threaten or commit another person with violence; provide, receive or invite another person to provide or receive instructions or training for purposes connected with organized crime; and being present at and consent to oathing or administer oathing.

The Act provides for tracing, confiscation, seizure and forfeiture of property connected to organized crime. The act gives the cabinet secretary responsible power to proscribe any group he/she finds engaged in organized criminal activities. The ownership of specified arms like AK47, G3, MP5 and others without a valid licence is criminalized.

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ince the collapse of Somalia in the early 1990’s, and the ramifications that followed, Kenya was in many ways affected. One of the most profound effects of Somalia’s implosion is the rise of youth radicalization especially in areas with substantial Muslim populations in North Eastern and Coast regions of Kenya. Today, youth radicalization is prevalent in the coastal region with tentacles attached to organized criminal groups.

Increasing numbers of youth have been recruited into radicalizing groups even though the extent, numbers and the modus operandi remains unknown. While state response at legal and policy level is well documented, socio-economic conditions are not yet fully understood as well as the capacity to forestall the problem in the coastal region. There have been concerns that state response has been confounded with abuse of human rights of the suspects and their families even though the extent and is scarcely known.

This study was, therefore, designed to establish stakeholders’ views on radicalization, the socio-economic conditions conducive to radicalization, effects of radicalization on society, and the strategies government has in place to address the problem of radicalization in the coast region. Finally, the study was aimed at generating actionable recommendations on how to address youth radicalization in the coastal region of Kenya.
The objectives of this study were to:
1. Establish and synthesize stakeholder views on violent youth radicalization in the coast region.
2. To investigate socio-economic conditions that nurture violent radicalization among the youth.
3. Find out the government response to radicalization including the policy and legal and operational levels.
4. Establish the effects of violent radicalization on society.

Given the sensitivity of the research topic and the area of its execution, the mixed methods approach was deployed. Each respondent or group of respondents were interviewed using different methods. Using multiple methods to examine the same phenomenon allows for triangulation of the data where convergence of the findings adds to confidence in the validity of the findings (Jick 1979). The other benefit of this approach was that the deficiencies of one method were counterbalanced by the strength of another, thereby allowing for the collection of more holistic and contextually rich data. The data collection process was undertaken in a consultative and participatory way. This led to the capture and generation of stakeholder views as well as develop consensus around the key themes and recommendations.

Primary Data
A short questionnaire was administered among randomly selected members of the public in Kwale, Mombasa and Kilifi counties. The quantitative information was used to measure various perceptions / opinions/ positions regarding radicalization. In this process, 351 respondents (aged between 18-62 years) were interviewed (49.3% in Mombasa, 27.1% Kwale and 23.6% Kilifi). In total, 58.4% were male and 41.6% female. All the respondents were born and have lived all or most of their lives in the coast region. They, therefore, understood and have lived with the problem of violet radicalization in their households and communities. Key informant interviews were held in the three counties with: government staff, civil
society, religious leaders and youth leaders. The diversity of the key informants helped to capture and develop a nuanced picture of the causes, situation of violent radicalization and set of recommendations for the coast region of Kenya. A total of 9 Focus Group Discussions were held (3 in each County) with youth, men and women.

Identification of Research Assistants
A total of 9 Research Assistants were recruited from the local respective communities. All of them were knowledgeable of the area, were able to communicate effectively in both local language and Kiswahili. All of them were Degree holders.

Training of Research Assistants
The Research Assistants were taken through a one day training. The purpose of the training was for them to understand the purpose of the research, to understand the objectives of the study, understand the questions to be asked and flow of the questions, how to approach a respondent, how to introduce oneself and ethical behaviour in research.

Pilot Survey
A one day pilot survey was undertaken to test the efficacy of the tools of data collection. The results and observations made were used to improve the tools of data collection and deployment in the field.

Quality Control
At the end of each day all the questionnaires were subjected to checking to ensure completeness and consistency. At the end those found of good quality were processed farther while others were returned for verification.

Data Analysis
The data was cleaned, coded and entered and analysed using the SPSS programme. Quantitative and qualitative data were then combined in writing the report.

6 Findings

Promoters of Violent Radicalization in the Coast Region
The development of violent radicalization in the coast region is largely and initially about change in the socio-economic circumstances, but lately it is about government approach in addressing radicalization.

Historical Land Injustices
The issue of skewed land ownership became the rallying call for Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). The coastal region (the ten mile coastal strip) was not part of the British Empire but remained under the Sultan of Zanzibar following an agreement with the British. Therefore, to MRC, the coastal people who live within the ten-mile strip were not part of colonial Kenya but were erroneously included in independent Kenya at independence in 1963 (Akinola, 2008; Botha, 2014). Hence, MRC’s slogan “Pwani si Kenya” is based on this fact, a fact that has penetrated into the minds of many youth. According to the respondents the issue of lumping coastal region into Kenya marked the beginning of land alienation by upcountry people and foreigners at the expense of local people. The main issue is that people from upcountry, notably from the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, own huge chunks of land with title deeds in the coast region when local people remain squatters.

Many indigenous people are evicted and dispossessed of their ancestral land by upcountry and foreign land title holders. Further, the process of land acquisition and title processing procedures are unknown to many coastal people in addition to
the complexities involved in lands offices. To local people the complexities in the lands offices are deliberately crafted to ward off local people while the procedure is relaxed for upcountry and foreign land owners. This knowledge (whether real or not) has pervaded the whole area and recruiters use it to justify their position. The ownership of beach front land is another grievance.

Most of the land is owned by powerful families and government officials from upcountry who sell to foreign investors to the exclusion of coastal people. In some cases lands that were reserved as government land or public land such as Msambweni Gazi which was set aside for coconut research and development was subdivided and is now owned by individuals from upcountry communities. Such skewed land ownership infuriates local youth and therefore a fertile justification for violent radicalization to remedy the unjust land ownership.

In cases where local people have attempted to process land ownership documents, many have given up because of the long and winding procedures. In some cases respondents reported double allocation. To coastal people this eventuality is deliberate government policy to deny local people land ownership rights. In areas earmarked for demarcation, many strangers some from upcountry emerge to claim ownership. In the words of one respondent:

When MRC emerged with the issue of land injustices, people supported them because they were tired. Nobody in government wanted to listen to us since they are the beneficiaries. Now this is the time that this issue must be addressed

Equally many respondents do not understand why land in the coastal region has not been surveyed yet in other parts of the country most land has been surveyed. To coastal people, the lack of survey is a deliberate government policy to make it easy for them to acquire it.

The skewed land ownership has created despair among the youth, and the land issue is a good and easy idea to sell to youth. Another respondent said:

Look at Waitiki farm in Likoni. Waitiki claims that he bought it from a white man. Local people have graves of their relatives on the farm who were buried long before Waititu allegedly bought it. Waititu does not even have any grave of his relative on the farm. Even the so-called white-man found people living on the land. Even the local people who neighbour Waititu farm have no title deeds yet Waititu has a title. You see such things will surely lead to radicalization

In Lamu, Manda Island belongs to one prominent family from upcountry Kenya. In the entire of Lamu County, only upcountry people, who were settled by the government at Mpeketoni area, were given land – this excluded the indigenous people. The latter saw this as discriminatory treatment of local people by the government. In Kilifi County, for instance, the land in Mambrui area had been allocated to Moi University for research. However the land has now been acquired and titles issued to senior government officials and politicians.

The ADC farm at Sabaki was allocated to upcountry people but local people were not beneficiaries. The cashewnut factory farm at Kilifi has been allocated to companies owned by upcountry people at the expense of locals. Therefore the unfair land ownership that benefits upcountry people more at the expense of local people has become a rallying ground for violent youth radicalization. A total of 73.8% of the respondents were of the view that violent youth radicalization in the coast region is related to unfair land ownership and 85.4% believe the government has not yet addressed the problem of land.

Economic Isolation and Disempowerment
There is a strong perception that there is a systematic economic isolation of the coastal people by successive governments in Kenya. For instance, there is a sentiment that the Youth Enterprise Development Fund is selectively applied to the detriment of coastal youth. That coast youth applicants of the Fund are limited to a maximum of Kshs. 50,000 per group irrespective of the magnitude of the business project. However, youth groups in other parts of the country are allowed to apply for up to Kshs. 200,000 – 300,000. In the Uwezo Fund, youth from coast region are limited to Kshs. 100,000 while youth in other parts of the country access amounts in excess of Kshs. 100,000. For youth, they find such discrepancies deliberate government machinations to economically disempower them. Tourism is the main business and a leading source of livelihood for many coastal households. However, an institution such as Utalii College is located in Nairobi to produce human capital for the coast region. The view is that its location away from the coast region was a deliberate government mechanism to economically disempower the people. The collapse of the cashewnut processing factory in Kilifi and the simultaneous establishment of a cashewnut processing factory in Thika town is seen as economic sabotage of the coast region.

That the government had been reluctant to revive it at its original location but facilitated the relocation of the machinery from Kilifi to Thika. The raw materials are produced in Kilifi but processed in Thika. Coast people who attempt to sell raw cashewnuts in Thika are not allowed on the pretext that they do not possess requisite licenses. The license holders are only people from Thika region. The loss of employment in Kilifi and the creation of employment in Thika is seen by local people as systematic economic isolation.

The other concern is that the government ignored the peoples requests to create an outgrower scheme at the Galana irrigation project for local people to produce maize for sale to the project. Since similar outgrower schemes created by government in the sugarcane, tea and coffee areas its refusal to do the same for coast people is part of the deliberate economic isolation scheme. Further many youth are not able to obtain the 30% contracts from the county governments out of what was described as nepotism and corruption in the county governments. Therefore, bad governance leading to frustration of youth has also made youth more vulnerable to radicalization.

Selective Issuance of National Identity Cards
Many youth have no identity card, which is a basic document for one’s identification. Possession of a National Identity Card (ID) is a prerequisite to many other things including employment or travelling. Many youth especially with Muslim names have the greatest difficulty in obtaining IDs and many others are denied. The requirement that one must present a Certificate of Good Conduct to apply for an ID, yet one must have an ID in order to apply for a Certificate of Good Conduct is ostensibly only applied against youth with muslim names. This requirement has left thousands of eligible youth without IDs. Some youth have missed scholarships on that account, some cannot be formally employed and they become vulnerable to police arrest on the account of having no ID. The problem is prominent in the entire coast region. Youth who do not have National Identity Cards are therefore denied an identity as Kenyan and therefore become ready fodder for radicalization and joining radicalized groups like Al Shabaab who readily recognize them, give them an identity and a livelihood.

Such youth feel they are discriminated against on the account of being Muslim. Efforts by Nyumba Kumi officials to help in identification of youth applicants have often been frowned upon by state officers. When youth miss opportunities on account of what they believe is having a Muslim name, they feel alienated and sooner or later, become radicalized. Many respondents 41.4% were of the view that having a Muslim name increases one’s chance of being denied a National Identity Card. Further 54.1% were aware that applying for a National Identity Card was a problem to youth and 38.8% of the respondents knew of a youth who had/has experienced difficulty in processing it. Further, 68.0% respondents believe the government has not addressed the issue of Identity Cards for youth or it is not willing to do so.

Collective Victimization and Punishment
Whenever police have undertaken raids on suspected extremist radicals, the approach has been indiscriminate and lacking in precision. In many cases, innocent people have been punished/victimized and their property destroyed. For example, Kombani area of Kwale, Mwandoni and Kisauni in Mombasa as well as Malindi town were affected by collective punishment. In the process, innocent people developed a negative view of police and the government. In order to
exact revenge, some choose to join violent radical groups as a vehicle for hitting back. Collective punishment has led to loss and/or injury of innocent relatives, friends and family members. In places where police have conducted swoops most youth are arrested. Hence 47.7% of the respondents were of the view that police harshly deal with the youth, their families and even neighbours.

Perception that Coastal People are discriminated Against in Employment
There is a strong perception that the government and other private sector employers do not prioritize coast people for employment. For example, at the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), a person from the coastal region last occupied the position of managing director over ten years ago; since then, however, that position has increasingly become the preserve of upcountry people. At the Kenya Maritime Authority, most top management and 80% of the Board of Directors are people from upcountry. At the Kenya Shipping Line most senior positions and the Board of Directors has a heavy upcountry representation. Private investors like Naivas supermarket allegedly recruited most of their staff from Nairobi.

The staff were allegedly ferried in two buses to Mombasa for employment at the expense of local people. That the apparent discrimination against coast people by government and private sector functions to inflame radicalization tendencies. What however, makes youth feel even more demoralized is that local leaders do not appear to protest the discriminatory employment tendencies that local people are subjected to. The level of unemployment is high in the coast region while opportunities for a livelihood are few. As such 85.2% of the respondents said that unemployment has contributed to youth developing violent radicalization views and joining Al Shabaab who readily offer a source of livelihood and 62.7% agreed that there is discrimination in employment against people from coast region.

Closure of Places of Worship
During government crackdowns on radicalized youth, several places of worship - mosques and churches - were closed down. Sakina Mosque, Musa’s Mosque and Swafar Mosque at Mwandoni were affected by this action. The SDA churches at Newlife Majengo, Salvation Army Church Majengo, Ziwan SDA Church at Mwandoni were closed by the owners for fear of security. The closure of places of worship by the government created more violently radicalized youth than the action was meant to control. Many followers took that as an affront on their religion by the state. In addition, the police forcefully entered the mosques in shoes, an action considered a defilement of their place of worship.

This act by government created the unintended and it became a rallying call for Al Shabaab recruitment in the coast region. Respondents indicated that the police could have arrested the youths if they laid siege outside the mosques instead of abusing them or even used intelligence to make the arrests. The Constitution of Kenya provides for freedom of worship. By police closing the mosques and churches the people were denied their constitutional right to worship freely. In this regard 29.6% of the respondents indicated that the government handling of religious issues contributed to more violent radicalization in the coast region. In addition, 48.8% of the respondents agreed that religious leaders contribute to youth developing radicalized views. Overall however, 33.0% respondents agreed that the highest form of youth radicalization is caused by religious people.

High Level of Ignorance
The absence of government curriculum for Islamic education became the loophole for madrassa teachers to exploit and pass radicalized ideas to unsuspecting youth. Therefore Muslim youth are more easily misled due to their limited knowledge. To the respondents the government has ignored Islamic education in the coast region hence radical Islamic teachers have taken advantage of the vacuum to propagate extremist views. Most misconceptions youth have about religion and society are transmitted through this avenue. Many youth are easily misinformed and given their little knowledge they take it as the solid truth. Most madrassa teachers have very low education and have a narrow understanding of Islam, there is no standard on which to measure their knowledge or qualifications. To most respondents 53.8% the socialization in madrassa has a strong bearing on development of radicalized views.

Government Approach to Addressing Youth Radicalization
The hard and military–like approach taken by government to address youth radicalization has greatly contributed to even more moderate youth becoming more radical. Respondents estimated that about 80% of the radicalized youth, between 2006 – 2015, were created by the government.
The targeted killings of preachers, youth and the disappearance of many youth following police arrest without trace has inflamed more people than ever before. The killings and disappearances helped to justify Al Shabaab messages that the government is out to reduce the Muslim population in the coast region. For instance night swoops by police, stripping women naked in front of their children indeed functioned to push many youth into radicalization. One respondent said the following:

When the police wanted Matheri, the notorious Nairobi - Kiambu murderer, they used intelligence to track him. They cornered him alone, keen not to harm other innocent people. However, in the coast region, the police undertake mass operations killing and injuring innocent people even when they are looking for one person. This treatment of people inflames their anger.

In the course of police operations many youth are arrested but not charged. While in police cells or other unknown places their relatives are not allowed to visit them. Youth without national identity cards are the most vulnerable to such arrests. In the mind of many respondents, such are violations of the rights of the people. Ethnic and religious profiling has also found their way here. Youth in beard are often arrested on suspicion of being radicalized. Arbitrary arrests have created more radicals than it was supposed to control.

A total of 19.3% of the respondents personally know a youth or other person who was arrested by police on the account of having radicalized views. Of these 49.3% know the arrested person was released and came back to his family, but to 50.7% the arrested person has not been seen since then. Again 17.4% of the respondents know of youth who disappeared from his/her village and has never been found. In addition 53.6% respondents confirmed that police harshly treated some family members known to them and thereafter 20.2% of them have seen some family develop very extreme views against police and government. Accordingly, 86.5% of the respondents were of the view that police handling of the youth made them develop negative views of them.

**Imposition of the Curfew and Deprivation of Livelihoods in Lamu**

Following a spate of killings and incursions by Al Shabaab in Lamu County in 2015 the government imposed a curfew. In the process, fishing which is the main source of livelihood was affected and outlawed. Given the seasonality of fishing, night fishing in particular was outlawed by government as a way of controlling Al Shabaab movement. In spite of the local peoples’ pleas to government to provide night security to fishermen or even register them, none was done. The consequence was that many households become desperate as they were deprived of their only source of livelihood. To some respondents, the position taken by government was a deliberate attempt to destroy the economy of the coast people. Earlier in 2012 the government had banned local people in Lamu from harvesting mangrove trees. Soon after government officers began harvesting the mangrove trees. To local people such actions by government are meant to sabotage the local economy and enrich its workers many of whom are from upcountry. With such grievances against government, Al Shabaab exploits the situation by providing ready income/source of livelihood to desperate households.

**Political Incitement**

Politicians out to make a name, regularly make a passionate appeal to the youth to show that the government and other parts of the country are against youth from the coast region. For instance when youth are arrested certain politicians protect them and fete them on release from custody. Statements like “government discriminates against coast people, we coast people are not educated, government hates Muslims, coast people have no intellect to be employed” are common fodder for politicians. Such views have functioned to make many youth develop radicalization against upcountry people and government.

In this regard 66.0% respondents showed that politicians considerably contribute to youth radicalization in the coast region. Overall, 31.0% respondents said politicians are the authors of
radicalization in the coast region as they use statements that appeal to and endear themselves to the electorate. The more anti-upcountry and anti-government statements one makes the more they position themselves as championing interests of coast people.

Emergence of Organized Criminal Gangs
New organized criminal gangs with very radical views now exist in many parts of the coast region. Watatiya Wao in Mombasa, Wakali Kwanza and Wakali Wao now rule certain parts of Kisauni. To the respondents, the gangs are associated with certain politicians and the police are aware of their existence but take no action, hence this has helped to buttress the common view that they exist with police and administration complicity. The criminal gangs have now become the bastion of Al Shabaab recruitment in Mombasa County especially.

Absence of Skills in the fishing industry
The fishing industry in the coast region has many opportunities to provide credible sources of livelihood for many people, but the skills to exploit this resource have not been developed. The failure to develop a fish training institute in the region, the failure by government to issue log books to ship/boat owners has denied them access to obtain credit from the financial institutions. There is no policy development in the process to recognize boat/ship ownership as formal collateral. Equally there is no formal system in place to issue divers with licences nor a formal training for sea fearers. The absence of these makes it easy to claim the existence of a systematic policy to isolate and economically disempower them. The existence of such sentiments make it easy for radicalization to take root.

Absence of Consistent Counter Radicalization Messages by Government
There exist many false and unsubstantiated information in the coastal region. The CDs with extreme messages are openly sold in the market, therefore, easily accessible. Several claims including; that National Youth Service recruits in the coast region are only meant to collect garbage in the towns while those from other regions are in the training institutes; the other is that Pwani University was allocated very low student admissions in 2015 while other universities in other regions had higher numbers; Utalii College was deliberately positioned away from the coastal region to deprive them of opportunities; that public funds offer coastal youth lower loan thresholds compared to youth from other parts of the country and that government intention is to reduce the Muslim population in Kenya. The existence of such mis-information has been exploited by radicalized groups to win followers. However, there is apparently no counter-messages to confront and correct the false information being peddled.

Effects of Violent Radicalization on Society
The following effects of violent radicalization on our society have been noted:

i. Relocation of Residence
Many areas that suffered regular police swoops were vacated. In these areas there has been a radical decline in housing rent and many houses are still vacant. The house owners have been badly affected following loss of income. According to respondents 49.1% some people abandoned their homes or relocated to perceived safer areas and 16.4% know family friends who relocated. The areas most affected by relocations are Majengo 39.3%, Likoni 22.1%, Lamu 17.9%, Kisauni 13.6%, Mpeketoni 10.0% and Ukunda 6.4%.

ii. Travel patterns
Many people are forced to revise their travel patterns. The areas perceived to be insecure are now avoided. The avoidance is at two levels: one can be a victim of police swoops or a victim of criminal gangs. Among the respondents 26.8% had not visited Majengo and Kisauni and had no intention of doing so in the near future.

iii. Decline in Business and rise in unemployment
In areas most affected many retail businesses were closed for fear of being arrested. The hotel industry has been the most affected. Many hotels have been closed due to lack of business thereby occasioning loss of employment. According to key informants familiar with the hotel industry there were 5000 employees working in the hotels in Malindi and Kilifi beach areas. However, after the rise of violent radicalization only about 50% are retained on seasonal employment. Currently bed occupancy is between 16 – 20%.
This has forced many investors to close their hotels. Similarly, some hotels have now
turned to conferencing as a survival strategy. In all 54.3% of the respondents were aware of general business closures in the area but 37.0% knew of particular businesses that closed down following the dynamics of youth radicalization. Again radicalization has affected youth in various way: Loss of employment 38.1%, loss of family members 36.4%, and loss of friends 12.4%. Areas most affected by business closures are Majengo 34.5%, Likoni 21.2%, Watamu 14.2%, Changamwe 8.0% and Kisauni 8.0%.

Recommendations

1. There is need to address the historical land related injustices at the coast by surveying the land and allocating it to the local people. This should also include easier processing of title deeds.
2. The government needs to streamline Islamic education by developing content and teacher training in order to control its teaching and forestall avenues for radicalization.
3. National and county governments in the coastal region should set aside special funds to purchase land for redistribution to local people (especially, squatters). In order to ensure bona-fide local people obtain such land, a register should be developed by local people and overseen by the local people.
4. Police officers should be reigned-in and encouraged to adopt intelligence-led action that does not victimise innocent people.
5. The ID registration and issuance process should have a human face to encourage genuine Kenyans to obtain these invaluable documents.
6. There is need to revive the fishing industry and develop skill trainings for youth.
7. There should be a clear national de-radicalisation framework for youth who return from Al Shabaab to encourage defections. Such youth could be a useful resource towards the anti-radicalization programmes.
8. Implement the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission recommendations on absentee landlords.
9. Use of counter messages by those credible voices and use of those who have disengaged from violent radicalization could help design more effective, factual based counter-radicalization messages.
10. Intelligence - led policing that is based on investigation, documentation, analysis and dissemination of police intelligence to inform and direct the deployment and undertaking of arrests. This is contrary with the use of brute force dependent on an individual officer’s suspicions that unlawful happening to influence police response.
11. There is need to adopt a community oriented counter-radicalization mechanism that is locally driven between police and the local community to increase community participation and build trust with the police.
12. There is need to entrench and utilize community policing and its Nyumba Kumi strategy. The collaborative effort between police and community built on trust on both sides can be more effective in identifying, preventing and resolving issues that are likely to lead to radicalization.
13. The police need to develop programmes for a more meaningful engagement with the youth. Police need to change their perceptions of the youth just like youth need to change their perceptions of the police for effective engagement to be realized. Once youth feel they are respected and valued by the police they are more likely to open up for productive engagement.
14. The state agencies need to engage with communities as it more beneficial to policing. Effective engagement with enhances their situational awareness about what is happening in communities and deepen their understanding of concerns within communities and this will in itself serve as a basis for informed policing. This will also help police identify critical situation.
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